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Balancing Privacy Interests and Investigatory Interests 
Legislative Analysis: House Bill 147, Daniel Zolnikov, R (HD 45) 
 
Hannah Wilson 
 
BILL FOR AN ACT ENTITLED: "AN ACT PROVIDING THAT A 
SEARCH WARRANT IS REQUIRED FOR A GOVERNMENT 
ENTITY TO ACCESS ANY ELECTRONIC DEVICE UNLESS 
INFORMED CONSENT IS OBTAINED OR A JUDICIALLY 
RECOGNIZED EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
EXISTS; PROVIDING THAT EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN 
VIOLATION IS NOT ADMISSIBLE; AND PROVIDING 
DEFINITIONS AND EXCEPTIONS." 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Privacy has been addressed in a string of United States Supreme 
Court cases incrementally increasing the scope of warrant-required 
searching. The Court held in 1969 that warrantless searches of spaces that 
do not pose a threat to an officer or are susceptible to the destruction of 
evidence are unjustifiable.1 This ruling was expanded in 2009 to apply the 
warrant requirement to vehicle searches.2 This string of cases culminated 
in the unanimous Riley v. California3 ruling that police officers generally 
cannot, without a warrant, search digital information on the cell phones 
seized from the defendants as incident to the defendants' arrests.4 Chief 
Justice Roberts wrote for the Court: “The answer to the question of what 
police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest 
is . . . simple — get a warrant.”5 This landmark decision highlighted the 
ability of the Fourth Amendment to adjust to the digital age and ushered 
in an era of “reasonableness balancing” to determine when a defendant’s 
privacy interests are violated.6 In all, it is an impressive response to 
technological development that left the door ajar for state legislatures to 
expand the ruling as they see fit.7 
Justice Alito concurred with the majority in Riley, but alluded to 
the expansion of privacy protections beyond those specified for cell 
phones in the federal system because “the nature of the electronic devices 
that ordinary Americans carry on their persons [will] continue to change.”8 
                                           
1 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
2 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
3 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014). 
4 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 2018 (1973); Arizona, 556 U.S. at 332. 
5 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.  
6 128 HARV. L. REV. 251 (2014). 
7 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497.  
8 134 S. Ct. at 2497. 
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Increasing numbers of Americans have integrated Fitbits, tablets, smart 
watches, computers, gaming systems, and smart TVs into their daily lives 
since the 2014 Riley decision.9 Have we reached the point in the modern 
world at which “we should not mechanically apply the rule used in the pre-
digital era to the search of a cell phone?”10 
In Montana, further investigation of information held on personal 
electronic devices is conducted through the use of “investigative 
subpoenas.”11 Montana's Constitution affords citizens broader protection 
of their right to privacy than does the federal Constitution.12 In general, 
infringement on privacy requires a “compelling state interest.”13 House 
Bill 147 (H.R. 147) of the 65th Montana Legislative Session seeks to 
heighten the privacy rights of Montanans regarding electronic devices.14 
The bill is carried by third-termer Daniel Zolnikov (R) of House District 
45 in Billings, whose sponsorships generally tend to promote privacy 
legislation and policy.15 H.R. 147 would require search warrants for 
government entities to access data on electronic devices, rather than 
investigative subpoenas, on which the State currently relies.16 The bill 
allows for the same judicially-recognized exceptions to warrant 
requirements, and specifies exceptions for informed, affirmative consent, 
voluntarily disclosed data, life-threatening situations, or emergencies.17 At 
first blush, it is difficult to distinguish search warrants from investigative 
subpoenas, and what they mean for Montanans who increasingly depend 
on various electronic devices for safekeeping personal information.  
 
II.   WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE? PROCEDURAL DISTINCTIONS 
BETWEEN WARRANTS AND INVESTIGATIVE SUBPOENAS 
 
The common underlying balance between individual privacy 
rights and the State’s compelling interest to enforce criminal laws exists 
beneath both warrants and investigative subpoenas. It can be difficult to 
separate their functions in practice. The Montana Supreme Court has 
commented on the similarities between search warrants and investigative 
                                           
9 Hearing to Require Search Warrant for Government Access to Electronic Devices, H.R. 147, 2017 
Leg., 65th Sess. (Mont. 2008) (sponsorship by Daniel Zolnikov, House District 45) [hereinafter 
Hearing]. 
10 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2496. 
11 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473. 
12 Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 121 (Mont. 1997). 
13 MONT. CONST. ART. II §§ 10–11. 
14 Requiring Search Warrant for Government Access to Electronic Devices, H.R. 147, 65th Leg. 
(Mont. 2017) [hereinafter H.R. 147]. 
15 Daniel Zolnikov, R, H.D. 45, THE 65TH MONTANA LEGISLATURE (May 14, 2014) (available at 
https://perma.cc/XR8R-KRKF). 
16 H.R. 147, supra note 14.  
17 Id.  
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subpoenas in the past. In State v. Nelson,18 search warrants and 
investigative subpoenas were nearly indistinguishable:  
 
When an investigative subpoena seeks discovery 
of protected medical records or information, the 
subpoena can be likened to a search warrant 
which must satisfy the strictures of the Fourth 
Amendment and Article II, Section 11 of the 
Montana Constitution. A search warrant can only 
issue upon a showing of "probable cause.”19 
 
Ultimately, investigative subpoenas and search warrants serve the 
same purpose: they are tools intended to solicit and secure information that 
can be used as evidence.  
A warrant requires probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, 
and may be applied for in criminal proceedings by peace officers, city or 
county attorneys, or the attorney general.20 Probable cause requires 
particularity and a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed 
coupled with a reasonable belief that evidence of the crime is where the 
search will occur.21 The burden of proof is on the State to prove probable 
cause prior to the issuance of the warrant.22 Warrants are general 
investigative tools, allowing the holder to search the entire vicinity of the 
warrant-authorized area.23 There is a wide latitude of searchable space for 
the investigator to explore when using a warrant. Warrants are already 
required for cell phone searches.24  
Unlike search warrants, investigative subpoenas are “animals of 
statute,” and are not anchored in the Montana Constitution.25 Investigative 
subpoenas may only be applied for by prosecutors.26 They must be issued 
by a judge.27 Generally, investigative subpoenas may be issued “when it 
appears upon the affidavit of the prosecutor that the administration of 
justice requires it to be issued.”28 In cases regarding “constitutionally 
protected material,” they require the heightened standard of a “compelling 
state interest” (referenced in Montana’s Constitution), in which the 
                                           
18 941 P.2d 441 at 449.  
19 Id. 
20 MONT. CONST. ART. II § 10; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-221 (2015). 
21 Id.  
22 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-220. 
23 Gant, 556 U.S. at 332. 
24 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2477. 
25 Symposium: Privacy in Cyberspace [Transcripts], 61 MONT. L. REV. 43, 55 (1999) [hereinafter 
Symposium]; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301. 
26 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301. 
27 Id. 
28 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301(2). 
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prosecutor must essentially demonstrate probable cause.29 Therefore, if the 
subpoena concerns “constitutionally protected material,” the subpoena and 
a search warrant would essentially be equivalent tools.30 Subpoenas are 
used in administrative, civil and criminal settings, therefore their 
applicability is much more expansive than search warrants, which are 
limited to criminal proceedings.31 They can be used to solicit information 
from third parties who might not necessarily be suspects in a crime that 
might be useful for law enforcement.32 
Given these differing procedural characteristics and the standard 
of proof required, it is well-established that it is more difficult to acquire 
a search warrant than an investigative subpoena.33 This means that if both 
our electronic devices and our cell phones are being held by the State, the 
government will have easier access to the electronic devices through the 
use of a subpoena because there is currently no warrant requirement for 
electronic device searches in Montana. Thus, we arrive at our next 
questions: whether those electronic devices ought to be given the same 
privacy protection as cell phones, that is, the protection of a search warrant 
requirement, and what are the practical ramifications of heightening our 
privacy? 
 
III.   ANALYSIS 
 
Our devices have immense storage capacity to record intimate 
data about our lives. Whether it’s your GPS location data, browsing 
history, or you’ve just been dumped by your soulmate,34 Montanans have 
an ubiquitous interest in keeping private the contents of their electronic 
devices. Hearkening back to the 1969 Chimel v. California35 decision, if 
there is no imminent threat of destruction of evidence or officer safety, 
there is no basis for warrantless cell phone searches.36 It logically follows 
that other electronic devices should be protected on the same basis – they 
are not subject to evidence destruction nor are they a threat to officer safety 
upon seizure. Whether this will be true in one year or twenty remains to 
be seen, but there are two sides to every coin.  
One concern associated with the use of search warrants is their 
lack of mobility. Search warrants lose much of their authority if a 
                                           
29 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301(3); MONT. CONST. ART. II § 10. 
30 Symposium, supra note 25, at 57. 
31 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301(2). 
32 Symposium, supra note 25. 
33 State v. Baldwin, 789 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Mont. 1990). 
34 Madhumita Murgia, Man Uses Fitbit to Show How a Break-up Affected his Heart Rate, The 
Telegraph (Jan. 20, 2016) (available at https://perma.cc/82M4-SQLU). 
35 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
36 Id. 
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defendant leaves Montana.37 A defendant’s departure requires Montana 
law enforcement to cooperate with law enforcement in other states to gain 
access to the device of interest.38 This could be a significant disadvantage 
to the warrant requirement in the eyes of constituents who value 
government accessibility to a defendant’s information. However, this 
already happens for physical items; if a box, car, or backpack is 
transported to another state, law enforcement face similar challenges.  
Opponents of H.R. 147 also claim that search warrants are more 
invasive than investigative subpoenas, because a search warrant allows the 
State to access and search an entire device, while an investigative 
subpoena’s request for information is limited to a specified, narrow set of 
information that must be relevant or otherwise linked to the 
investigation.39 Whether this is negated by the ease with which one may 
acquire an investigative subpoena is up for interpretation. In addition to 
these practical differences, search warrants and investigative subpoenas do 
not congruently impose the burden of proof on the parties.40 Search 
warrants put the burden of proof on the State to prove probable cause.41 
They allow the State to gain nearly unrestricted access to property without 
notice, which is advantageous for the prosecution.42 On the other hand, 
investigative subpoenas generally require the defendant or suspect to 
produce something with notice.43 This means they are characteristically 
less invasive than search warrants, because they allow the defendant or 
suspect to object to or limit the scope of the subpoena.44 
H.R. 147 essentially equates cell phones to other personal 
electronic devices in terms of how much privacy they are granted.45 It 
would require probable cause for all electronic device searches because 
the searches would be reliant on the issuance of a search warrant. Probable 
cause is already required for some forms of subpoenas,46 and for those the 
subpoena functions identically to a search warrant. In passing H.R. 147, 
“code clutter” would arguably be reduced at the expense of changing the 
burden of proof only for “administration of justice” subpoenas for 
electronically stored information.47 If the bill fails, prosecutors would 
benefit from a statute clarifying a more specific understanding of what 
exactly constitutes “constitutionally protected material,”48 or there could 
                                           
37 Hearing, supra note 9 (Testimony by Montana County Attorneys Association). 
38 Id. 
39 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301(1); State v. Bilant, 36 P.3d 883, 889 (Mont. 2001). 
40 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-221. 
41 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-221; Baldwin, 789 P.2d at 1219. 
42 Baldwin, 789 P.2d at 1219.  
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 H.R. 147, supra note 14. 
46 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301(3). 
47 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301(2). 
48 Id. 
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be a trend of law enforcement more frequently meeting the probable cause 
burden of proof so as to qualify for either a warrant or a subpoena. The 
Judiciary Committee was reminded that the probable cause burden is 
already mandated for cell phones, as they are subject to warrants prior to 
searching.49  
If electronic device searches become subject to the warrant 
requirement, the government will be faced with increasingly common 
warrant requests in criminal trials. Warrants are more time-consuming to 
issue, and have a higher burden of proof, which would result in fewer 
searches of electronic devices generally. An interesting implication for law 
enforcement subject to this bill is that there would no longer be an 
incentive to solicit information from third party or other non-suspect 
electronic devices because subpoenas are easier to acquire than warrants. 
There could be a refocus of information-gathering toward the defendant or 
suspect and effort directed toward strategically securing search warrants. 
More fundamentally, sources of information on personal electronic 
devices would be less desirable for prosecutors because of the warrant 
requirement and the State may prefer to reallocate its time and resources 
toward other non-digital sources of information by using investigative 
subpoenas. 
An alternative to requiring probable cause and warrants for 
searches of electronic devices is to simply limit the scope of the 
investigative subpoena. If probable cause could be required for 
investigative subpoenas that do not necessarily concern constitutionally 
protected material, the goals of the legislation could be achieved without 
implicating search warrants. This option could potentially be even more 
advantageous to defendants or suspects because it imposes the higher 
burden of proof on the State (probable cause), while at the same time 
allowing the defendant or suspect the autonomy to produce the 
information with notice, or object to the issuance of the subpoena before 
the search occurs.50 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
Computers and digital devices have weakened the Fourth 
Amendment. Fitbits and smart TVs were not at the forefront of the minds 
of the Fourth Amendment drafters, and Justice Alito seemed to anticipate 
this development, forecasting that state legislatures would draw 
“reasonable distinctions based on categories of information or perhaps 
other variables.”51 He recognized that electronic surveillance has been 
primarily governed by statute, and legislatures are in the best position to 
                                           
49 Hearing, supra note 9 (Testimony by Montana County Attorneys Association). 
50 Baldwin, 789 P.2d at 1219. 
51 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497. 
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adapt rules relating to our changing electronic landscape.52 A unanimous 
United States Supreme Court, Representative Daniel Zolnikov, and H.R. 
147 opponents all seem to agree on one thing: protecting the digital 
privacy rights of constituents is critical in sustaining the power of the 
Fourth Amendment. The division occurs in the method by which the 
privacy is protected – through search warrants or investigative subpoenas. 
The State seeks easier access to electronically stored information while 
defendants lean on Montana’s robust privacy protections to restrict access 
to their devices. There is a precarious point at which the investigatory 
interests of the State must be balanced with the privacy interests of the 
defendant, and this bill treads the line between those interests. 
Which would you rather have standing between the State and your 
electronic devices? An investigative subpoena, or a search warrant? Phone 
your legislators and let them know what you think! 
 
                                           
52 Id.  
